

Private Truths, Public Lies within agent-based modeling

(NCN 2019/35/B/HS6/02530)

Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron
Department of Theoretical Physics

Workshop on Sociophysics, Social Phenomena from a Physics Perspective

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Imagine that ...

- Your supervisor invites to the party at her home
- The home is newly renovated
- She asks you „How do you like it?”
- The look does not appeal to you
- What would you answer?



Inspiration

- Jędrzejewski A, Marcjasz G, Nail PR, Sznajd-Weron K (2018) Think then act or act then think? PLoS ONE 13(11): e0206166
- Towards understanding of the social hysteresis: an agent-based approach, NCN 2019/35/B/HS6/02530, 2020-2024




RESEARCH ARTICLE

Think then act or act then think?

Arkadiusz Jędrzejewski¹, Grzegorz Marcjasz², Paul R. Nail³, Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron^{1*}


¹ Faculty of Fundamental Problems of Technology, Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland, ² Faculty of Pure and Applied Mathematics, Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland, ³ Faculty of Psychology and Counseling, University of Central Arkansas, Conway, Arkansas, United States of America



Timur Kuran,
Private Truth, Public Lies
Harvard University Press,
1995, 1997





Preference falsification

- The act of communicating a preference that differs from one's true preference
- Main reason: believe the expressed preference is more acceptable socially
- Huge social and political consequences, ex: unanticipated revolutions
- Opinion on two levels: public and private
- Not like in the CODA model:
 - André C.R. Martins, Continuous opinions and discrete actions in opinion dynamics problems, IJMPC 19 (2008)



The model


- N agents
 - Public opinion $S_i(t) = \pm 1$
 - Private opinion $\sigma_i(t) = \pm 1$
- Only $S_i(t)$ is seen by others
- Two types of social responses
 - Independence with p
 - Conformity with $1 - p$
- Conformity
 - compliance (unanimous q -panel)
 - disinhibitory contagion

		PRIVATE (INTERNAL)	
		$\sigma_i(t) = +1$	$\sigma_i(t) = -1$
PUBLIC (EXTERNAL)	$S_i(t) = +1$		
	$S_i(t) = -1$		



Two types of conformity

- Compliance: public conformity without private acceptance
 - Asch experiment
 - Increases with the size of the group
 - Unanimity is crucial

Asch's Classic Study of Conformity



Subjects were shown the cards at the left and asked to choose the line in the picture on the bottom that was the same length as the line in the picture on the top. The confederates deliberately chose incorrect answers to see if the unsuspecting subject (#6) would go along with the majority.



Two types of conformity

- Disinhibitory contagion
 - Appears in the case of the internal intra-psychic conflict
 - Single person can influence
 - Example by Paul Nail in „Think then act ... „ PloS One 13 (2018)




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- The diagram illustrates a network of 7 nodes arranged in a hexagonal pattern with a central node. Each node contains a stylized human figure. The central node and two nodes on the top edge (top-left and top-right) show a green figure with a green arrow pointing upwards. The other four nodes (middle-left, middle-right, bottom-left, and bottom-right) show a green figure with a red arrow pointing downwards. The nodes are connected by lines forming a hexagon and a central connection to the middle node.

Act then **T**hink (AT) model

- choose one voter at random, located at site i
- Act: update the **public** opinion S_i
 - **Independence with prob p** : replace public opinion by the private one


$$S_i \rightarrow \sigma_i$$



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


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- **Conformity with prob $1 - p$** :
 - 1) pick randomly q neighbours without repetition




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- **Conformity with prob $1 - p$** :
 - 1) pick randomly q neighbours without repetition
 - 2) $S_i = \sigma_i$? NO: disinhibitory contagion $S_i \rightarrow \sigma_i$ if one $S_{ix} = \sigma_i$

Ex: $q = 2$




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
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$$S_i \rightarrow \sigma_i$$

- **Conformity with prob $1 - p$** :
 - 1) pick randomly q neighbours without repetition
 - 2) $S_i = \sigma_i$? YES
 - 3) unanimous: $S_{i1} = \dots = S_{iq}$? YES: $S_i \rightarrow S_{i1}$

Ex: $q = 2$




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- Act: update the **public** opinion S_i
 - **Independence with prob p** : replace public opinion by the private one

$$S_i \rightarrow \sigma_i$$


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Ex: $q = 2$



Act then **T**hink (AT) model

- choose one voter at random, located at site i
- Act: update the **public** opinion S_i
- Think: update the **private** opinion σ_i




Act then Think (AT) model

- choose one voter at random, located at site i
- Act: update the **public** opinion S_i
- **Think**: update the **private** opinion σ_i
 - **Independence with prob p**

$$\sigma_i \xrightarrow{1/2} -\sigma_i$$

- **Conformity with prob $1 - p$** :
 - 1) pick randomly q neighbours without repetition
 - 2) unanimous: $S_{i1} = \dots = S_{iq}$? YES: $\sigma_i \rightarrow S_{i1}$

Ex: $q = 2$




„Act then Think” (Public then private) or ...?

- „It’s true that we sometimes stand up for what we believe.”
- „But it’s also true that we come to believe in what we stand up for.”
- „Saying Becomes Believing”


“If social psychology has taught us anything during the last 25 years, it is that we are likely not only to think ourselves into a way of acting but also to act ourselves into a way of thinking.”

[David G. Myers,
Social Psychology 10th Ed.
page 131]



Two versions of the model: AT vs. TA

- **A**ct then **T**hink (AT) model
 - choose one voter at random, located at site i
 - Act: update the **public** opinion S_i
 - Think: update the **private** opinion σ_i
- **T**hink then **A**ct (TA) model
 - choose one voter at random, located at site i
 - Think: update the **private** opinion σ_i
 - Act: update the **public** opinion S_i



What do we measure?

- The fraction of individuals with the positive public opinion:


$$c_S(t) = \frac{N_{S=1}(t)}{N}$$

- The fraction of individuals with the positive private opinion:


$$c_\sigma(t) = \frac{N_{\sigma=1}(t)}{N}$$

- The level of dissonance = the fraction of individuals that have different public and private opinions:


$$d(t) = \frac{1}{2N} \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - S_i(t)\sigma_i(t))$$




$$S_i(t) = 1$$



$$\sigma_i(t) = 1$$




$$S_i(t)\sigma_i(t) = -1$$




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
On the private level the majority is smaller



Stationary value of the dissonance



$$d(t) = \frac{1}{2N} \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - S_i(t)\sigma_i(t))$$





$$S_i(t)\sigma_i(t) = -1$$

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

Watts-Strogatz (WS) network $\langle k \rangle = 14, \beta = 0.1$?

(a) $q = 4$



Public: $S_i(t) = 1$




(b) $q = 4$




Private: $\sigma_i(t) = 1$

Person vs. situation


Queched vs. annealed



Person approach: public positive opinions on the Watts-Strogatz network $\langle k \rangle = 14, \beta = 0.1$




(a) $q = 4$




(b) $q = 5$

Person approach: dissonance on the Watts-Strogatz network $\langle k \rangle = 14, \beta = 0.1$






(a) $\langle k \rangle = 14, q = 5$



(b) $\langle k \rangle = 14, q = 4$

Summary

- Looking just at opinions $TA=AT$
- Critical point for private and public opinions is the same
- On the private level the majority decreases faster
- Looking at dissonance:
 - AT – increases with independence
 - TA – non-monotonic behaviour, much lower than for AT





It's ok to follow the
crowd but ... think first!